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The commercialization of air taxis and autonomous passenger 
drones will one day congest urban airspace. Operators expect that, 
once flights are autonomous and the cost of service falls, high-traffic 
urban “vertiports” could see hundreds of air taxi takeoffs and 
landings per hour. Low-altitude airspace—between 200 feet and 
5,000 feet above ground level—offers a relatively blank slate to 
explore new regulatory models for air traffic management and avoid 
command-and-control mistakes made in the past in aviation. 
Regulators’ current proposals would centralize air taxi traffic 
management into a single system to coordinate air taxi traffic, but 
this approach likely creates technology lock-in and unduly benefits 
the initial operators at the expense of later innovators. To facilitate 
the development of the air taxi market, regulators should consider 
demarcating aerial travel corridors and auctioning exclusive-use 
licenses to operators for use of those corridors, much like regulators 
auction radio spectrum licenses and offshore wind energy sites. 
Exclusive rights to routes would allow transfer and sale to more 
efficient operators and would also give operators the certainty they 
need to finance the substantial capital investments. 
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With advancements in aviation technology, low-altitude 
airspace presents a vast new resource for automated transportation 
and delivery services. Vertical takeoff and landing aircraft, also 
called VTOLs or air taxis, are a new aerial transportation service 
currently in development. VTOL aircraft and drone companies 
expect that with computation advancements, autonomous VTOLs 
will bring down the price of flights and make mass air transit 
possible. Travelers in the future might routinely fly from downtown 
Washington, D.C. to Dulles International Airport in under ten 
minutes and Chicago families could escape the city heat and shuttle 
high above Lake Michigan to Indiana dunes and beaches in under 
twenty minutes. To prevent “route-squatting” and to facilitate the 
development of this market the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) should consider demarcating aerial travel corridors and 
auctioning exclusive-use licenses to VTOL operators for use of 
those corridors.1 
 
 1 Aerospace firms and vendors are identifying low-altitude aerial routes in 
anticipation of urban air mobility services. See, e.g., Nexa Capital Partners 
launches Urban Air Mobility Geomatics, EVTOL MAGAZINE (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://evtol.com/news/nexa-capital-partners-launches-urban-air-mobility-
geomatics/ [https://perma.cc/6L24-UKQU] (providing an example of a company 
offering aerospace industry customers “capabilities such as identifying simple 
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Perhaps the primary obstacle to urban air mobility is integration 
of thousands of VTOL aircraft into regulated federal airspace. The 
U.S. aviation industry has a commendable safety record and 
regulators are cautious. However, the technological shock—the 
commercialization of air taxis—will create novel urban airspace 
scarcity and collective action conflicts. The overwhelmed U.S. air 
traffic control system handles about 5,000 aircraft in the sky at a 
given time.2 U.S. regulators acknowledge that traditional air traffic 
management will not be able to handle drones and VTOLs.3 When 
intended uses conflict, how should low-altitude airspace be 
allocated? This is an old problem for a resource: the transformation 
of a common pool resource in the face of intensive, new uses.4 Ad 
hoc regulatory interventions won’t suffice, nor will traditional air 
traffic control, as aviation authorities in the U.S. appear to be 
preparing to largely delegate day-to-day low-altitude airspace 
management of drones and VTOLs to commercial operators.5 
 
‘verti-pairs’ (flights between two vertiports) that can support profitable eVTOL 
operations”). 
 2 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., Air Traffic By The Numbers, https://www.faa.gov/ 
air_traffic/by_the_numbers/ [https://perma.cc/ZRS7-3ZDB] (last modified June 
6, 2019). VTOLs and drones could plausibly exceed that number in a single city. 
Uber, Uber Elevate Summit 2018: Live Stream Day 1 (Part 2) at 3:55:20, 
YOUTUBE (May 8, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWvQuk0_xjs 
[https://perma.cc/UKT8-XYGK] (“If you ask: Can we add thousands of aircraft 
and control them in the traditional way? The answer is: Absolutely not.”). 
 3 NASA, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 
(UTM) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS VERSION 1.0 2 (May 18, 2018), 
https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/docs/2018-UTM-ConOps-v1.0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MD38-FAYS] (“Given the number and type of UAS operations 
envisioned, it is clear that the existing Air Traffic Management (ATM) System 
cannot cost-effectively scale to deliver services for UAS. Further, the nature of 
most of these operations does not require direct interaction with the ATM 
System.”). 
 4 See Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights and Governance Strategies: How 
Best to Deal with Land, Water, Intellectual Property, and Spectrum, 14 COLO. 
TECH. L.J. 181, 188–89 (2016). 
 5 See Press release, NASA, NASA Completes its Latest Drone Traffic 
Management Flight Campaign, (June 8, 2017) https://www.nasa.gov/aero/nasa-
completes-latest-drone-traffic-management-flight-campaign 
[https://perma.cc/5NGT-6CWA]. 
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Private management of low-altitude airspace to accommodate 
VTOLs is still at a nascent stage. Theorists, regulators, and 
lawmakers have the daunting task of ascertaining which legal 
institutions for airspace optimize public use, safety, and benefit.6 
Since a side-by-side comparison of legal institutions for airspace is 
infeasible at present, this article looks to property theory and draws 
on how the government disposes of other public assets to private 
management. 
For traditional aviation, air traffic management is centralized 
and relies on complex collaboration between airlines, the general 
aviation industry, air traffic controllers, and regulators. Safe 
separation between aircraft,7 routes,8 and slot fees9 are highly 
regulated in this interconnected system. Economic distortions result 
from the regulated rationing of airspace and terminal access.10 Low-
 
 6 Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 412 (1987) 
(“The task of justification has been to show what general set of legal institutions 
will advance the welfare of the public at large, when measured against the next 
best alternative.”). See also RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE 
LAW 153–154 (1990) (urging theorists to use an opportunity-cost approach “when 
dealing with questions of economic policy and to compare the total product 
yielded by alternative social arrangements”). 
 7 Radar separation standards typically require air traffic controllers to maintain 
at least three nautical miles between aircraft near airports. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
Final Report 7, Research, Engineering and Development Advisory Committee, 
Separation Standards Working Group (2006), 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ang/offices/tc/about/
campus/faa_host/RDM/media/pdf/Report-SepStandardsWorkingGroup.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6FLQ-KDNP]. See North Atlantic Operations – Airspace, 
SKYBRARY, https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/North_Atlantic_Operations_-
_Airspace [https://perma.cc/N7QY-DLKU] (explaining that aircraft flying over 
the North Atlantic have prescribed vertical and horizontal minimum separation). 
 8 Fed. Aviation Admin., Instrument Procedures Handbook 2–2 (2017) 
(“Airways can be thought of as three-dimensional highways for aircraft. In most 
land areas of the world, aircraft are required to fly airways between the departure 
and destination airports. The rules governing airway routing, Standard Instrument 
Departures (SID) and Standard Terminal Arrival (STAR), are published flight 
procedures that cover altitude, airspeed, and requirements for entering and leaving 
the airway.”). 
 9 49 U.S.C. § 41714 (2012) (defining “slot” as “a reservation for an instrument 
flight rule takeoff or landing by an air carrier of an aircraft in air transportation.”). 
 10 Trump Wants to Privatize Air Traffic Control; Canada and Europe Prove It 
Will Work, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY (June 5, 2017), 
OCT. 2019] Auctioning Airspace 83 
altitude airspace—used here to mean between 200 feet and 5,000 
feet above ground level11—offers a relatively blank slate to explore 
new models for air transport and avoid command-and-control 
mistakes made in the past in aviation. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Part I briefly covers the 
commercial VTOL industry, the history of airspace regulation, and 
public property theory. Part II describes U.S. regulators’ tentative 
plans for VTOL aircraft management and the “regulated commons” 
model, which resembles today’s air traffic control, whereby routes 
and terminal access are shared and managed within a single 
unmanned traffic management (UTM) system or database. Part III 
describes likely competitive and technical problems with this 
regulated commons and UTM approach. Part IV introduces a 
different idea: that the FAA instead delimit geographic tracts of low-
altitude airspace and assign exclusive-use licenses to those aerial 




MBV8] (“The Federal Aviation Administration-run ATC system in the U.S., in 
contrast, has been a monument to mismanagement and waste.”). DJ Gribbin et al., 
Toward a More Efficient Use of Airspace, 76 J. TRANSP. L., LOGISTICS & POL’Y 
20, 92 (2009) (“Slots are a valuable public resource; yet they have been 
underutilized for decades as a result of a failure to clearly define property rights 
to slots and to provide appropriate incentives for slots to be used in a manner of 
greatest benefit to the traveling public.”). See also Marvin S. Soroos, The 
Commons in the Sky: The Radio Spectrum and Geosynchronous Orbit as Issues 
in Global Policy, 36 INT’L ORG. 665, 673–74 (1982) (describing the hoarding of 
geosynchronous orbital slots when assigned via regulation). 
 11 VTOL use today appears to be contemplated up to 5000 feet. Margaret 
Brown, New York Drone Corridor Enables Testing of UAS Platforms and UTM 
Technologies in Real-World Settings, THE NEW AIRSPACE (June 5, 2018), 
https://thenewairspace.com/2018/06/05/new-york-drone-corridor-enables-
testing-of-uas-platforms-and-utm-technologies-in-real-world-settings/ 
[https://perma.cc/RFF8-2DU8]. Airspace use below 200 feet raises fraught 
questions about the property rights of landowners and is outside the purview of 
this paper. See Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252, 254 
(1991) (“Courts are notoriously unwilling to quantify the extent of the airspace 
which falls within the dominion of the landowner . . . .”); Colin Cahoon, Low 
Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 
191 (1990) (“[C]ourts have yet to adopt a uniform theory of airspace property 
ownership.”). 
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locations, aircraft size, UTM technologies, and pricing choices 
would largely be delegated to the tract licensees. Finally, Part V 
explains why this approach, which draws on real-world examples 
from spectrum auctions and other federal asset markets, may offer 
more competitive UTMs and dynamic efficiencies for low-altitude 
air transit. This auction approach also allows aviation regulators to 
focus less on scientific management of airspace and UTM 
interoperability and more on aircraft safety, dangerous weather, and 
inspections. 
This article assumes that navigable airspace will remain publicly 
owned and does not propose the introduction of fee simple property 
in this airspace.12 James Buchanan’s work on club goods13 initiated 
a rich literature that shuns the private property-public property 
dichotomy in favor of nuanced analysis of various categories on the 
“property spectrum.” 14 In that vein, this article analyzes a common 
category on the spectrum, “licensed property”: publicly-owned 
resources that are used or processed by private operators for 
commerce and public benefit.15 
 
 12 This paper proposes for airspace what Prof. Raymond dubbed “licensed 
property.” See LEIGH RAYMOND, PRIVATE RIGHTS IN PUBLIC RESOURCES: 
EQUITY AND PROPERTY ALLOCATION IN MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 14 (Routledge 2003). 
 13 James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1, 1 
(1965) (noting there is “a whole spectrum of ownership-consumption 
possibilities, ranging from the purely private or individualized activity on the one 
hand to purely public or collectivized activity on the other.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Aleksandar D. Slaev & Marcus Collier, Managing Natural 
Resources: Coasean Bargaining versus Ostromian Rules of Common 
Governance, 85 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 47 (2018); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING 
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(2011). 
 15 See RAYMOND, supra note 12. Licensed property means “a private legal right 
that provides a significant degree of security and exclusivity to resource users but 
remains unprotected from future government adjustment or cancellation without 
compensation.” Id. at 15. Other types of licensed property in the United States 
include unpatented mining claims, federal grazing permits, and individual 
transferable quotas for fisheries. Id. at 18-23. See, e.g., Vernon L. Smith, On 
Divestiture and the Creation of Property Rights in Public Lands, 2 CATO J. 663 
(1982); Walter J. Mead, Natural Resource Disposal Policy—Oral Auction Versus 
Sealed Bids, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 194 (1967). 
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Aviation regulators should assess the feasibility of airspace 
auctions promptly because, as described below, it is very difficult to 
introduce such market-based assignment later, even after the 
drawbacks of a regulated commons regime are obvious. The FAA’s 
Drone Advisory Committee included this proposal in its 2018 
report.16 Subsequently, in the FAA’s 2018 reauthorization law, 
Congress instructed the Government Accountability Office to study 
this airspace auction proposal as a financing mechanism.17 VTOL 
companies would like to start testing commercial service as early as 
2023 in the U.S.,18 and timely resolution of airspace deconfliction is 
essential for the industry to thrive. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Before discussing VTOL traffic management approaches, a 
description of the VTOL industry, airspace regulation, and 
underlying property theory is required to familiarize readers with the 
technology and regulatory tradeoffs. 
A. VTOL Transportation Industry 
Though designs vary, VTOLs tend to be multi-rotor, one- to six-
passenger aircraft that land and take off like helicopters and fly at 
 
 16 See DRONE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DRONE 
INTEGRATION FUNDING FINAL REPORT 21–22, (Mar. 2018), 
https://www.rtca.org/sites/default/files/dac_tg3_funding_report_long_term_final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/B49F-5BGN] (discussing the “Auction or Lease of 
Airspace”). The author was invited to present the idea of airspace auctions to Task 
Group 3 in 2017. 
 17 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 360(b) (instructing 
the Comptroller Generalto study “any recommendations of Task Group 3 of the 
Drone Advisory Committee”). Task Group 3 of the FAA’s Drone Advisory 
Committee included airspace auctions as a possible mechanism for funding drone 
regulation. See also DRONE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 21-22 
(discussing the “Auction or Lease of Airspace”). 
 18 Marcy de Luna, Uber’s flying taxis are coming to one Texas city in 2023, 
HOUSTON CHRON. (June 19, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/ 
news/transportation/article/Uber-Air-Skyports-launch-Dallas-Texas-2023-
14015577.php [https://perma.cc/K9X5-5Q6D]. 
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several hundred feet above the ground.19 Electric VTOL (eVTOL) 
companies are designing battery-powered aircraft for commuter and 
intra-metropolitan transportation, that is, a range up to sixty miles.20 
Other companies are designing hybrid (fuel-electric) VTOLs, which 
will have a range of a few hundred miles and serve inter-city 
routes.21 VTOLs in urban areas would land at helipads and, one day, 
“vertiports”—specially-designed helipad-like landing structures for 
VTOL operations.22 
Improvements in manufacturing, battery technology, sensors, 
autonomous systems, and networking have spurred a global race to 
commercialize autonomous air taxi flight, and companies have 
completed test flights.23 VTOL companies are planning to test 
(piloted, at first) VTOL flights in the U.S. in the next few years and 
 
 19 See Electric VTOL News, eVTOL Aircraft Directory, 
https://evtol.news/aircraft/ [https://perma.cc/MKK5-5M44] (last visited Sep. 9, 
2019), for examples of eVTOL and hybrid VTOL designs. 
 20 See Jerry Siebenmark, Uber Elevate Summit Lays Out 2023 Flight Plan, AIN 
ONLINE (June 28, 2019), https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ 
business-aviation/2019-06-28/uber-elevate-summit-lays-out-2023-flight-plan 
[https://perma.cc/2LHQ-AYLV]. 
 21 See, e.g., Talia Avakian, Flying Taxi Company Wants to Get You From New 
York City to Boston in 36 Minutes, TRAVEL + LEISURE (Oct. 2, 2018), 
https://www.travelandleisure.com/airlines-airports/transcend-air-corporation-
flying-taxis [https://perma.cc/ZU8N-4T3F]; Loz Blain, Joby’s wild 16-rotor 
convertible aircraft for long-range, high-speed, electric VTOL commuting, NEW 
ATLAS (Dec. 2, 2015), https://newatlas.com/joby-s2-tilt-rotor-vtol-multirotor-
aircraft-concept/40662/ [https://perma.cc/4NKP-TA5N]. 
 22 See Joe Pappalardo, The “Mega Skyport” Is a Fanciful Future Landing Spot 
for Uber’s Flying Taxis, POPULAR MECHANICS (July 19, 2018), 
https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/a22454961/mega-skyport-uber-
flying-taxi-vertiport/ [https://perma.cc/Y92G-P3EB]. 
 23 In early 2018, Chinese drone maker Ehang flew an autonomous VTOL on a 
15-kilometer (9.3 mile) route. Andrew J. Hawkins, Ehang’s passenger-carrying 
drones look insanely impressive in first test flights, THE VERGE (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/5/16974310/ehang-passenger-carrying-drone-
first-test-flight [https://perma.cc/BA59-VZ42]; Matthew Campbell, Jie Ma, & 
Kiyotaka Matsuda, Japan is Getting Serious About Flying Cars, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
features/2019-01-22/the-birthplace-of-the-walkman-wants-to-be-first-in-flying-
cars [https://perma.cc/4RCS-NA3U]. 
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to scale up operations as technology and regulation allow.24 Already 
in 2019, a Chinese eVTOL company, Ehang, began flying tourists 
in a two-passenger, autonomous eVTOL aircraft,25 and many 
companies are testing aircraft around the world. 
If regulators allow this form of transportation, and the costs of 
flight fall with the introduction of autonomous systems and UTM, 
the busiest VTOL vertiports would see hundreds of takeoffs and 
landings per hour.26 At scale, there will be a need to manage flights 
landing or taking off every few seconds from each high-traffic 
vertiport, and each VTOL will have to be charged, cleaned, and 
turned over for a new flight in minutes.27 Many VTOL (and perhaps 
large drone) operations may depend on these tight turnarounds, and 
vertiports require substantial investments in terminals, operations, 
and infrastructure. 
The nascent vertical takeoff and landing aircraft industry could 
stimulate substantial consumer demand for millions of low-altitude 
passenger flights in the U.S. annually. Regulators are likely to see 
several UTM and VTOL operators in urban areas.28 It’s possible to 
 
 24 See Emily Chang & Thomas Black, Boeing CEO Says Air-Taxi Prototype 
Will Be Ready for Takeoff Next Year, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-03/boeing-ceo-sees-air-taxi-
prototype-ready-for-takeoff-next-year [https://perma.cc/7AX6-7DDX]. 
 25 Chen Chuanren, China Abuzz with eVTOL Action, AIN ONLINE (Apr. 17, 
2019), https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/business-aviation/2019-04-
17/china-abuzz-evtol-action [https://perma.cc/TW6S-P65E]. 
 26 At a 2018 conference devoted to the nascent industry, for instance, Uber 
representatives estimated, based on Uber trip data, that if prices fall according to 
their models there is demand for hundreds of thousands of daily air taxi trips and 
the potential need for 40 vertiports the Los Angeles area alone. Uber, Uber 
Elevate Summit 2018: Live Stream Day 1 (Part 1), YOUTUBE (May 8, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hnceMcSnjQ0 [https://perma.cc/H9EV-
QSHA]. 
 27 Id. “In this 40-node network [in the Los Angeles region], about 80% of 
the nodes require a throughput of about 400 to 800 landings per hour.” 
 28 Uber, Amazon, Google, Skyward, Airmap, Thales, Rockwell Collins, and 
others all anticipate being in the UTM space. Some plan to manage drones, some 
plan to manage VTOLs, and some plan to manage both types of services. See, 
e.g., Press Release, NASA, supra note 5; Luke Geiver, Global airspace group 
headed to NY for UAS UTM work, UAS MAGAZINE (Apr. 7, 2018), 
http://www.uasmagazine.com/articles/1842/global-airspace-group-headed-to-ny-
for-uas-utm-work [https://perma.cc/A334-QQYK]; Mike Ball, Rockwell Collins 
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make out the shape of competing business models and use cases—
and sources—of airspace conflicts. Should urban VTOL corridors 
be for rapid commuting or for slower freight? Should regular, 
scheduled flights receive takeoff and landing precedence over 
episodic, recreational flights? How should landing, takeoff, and 
maintenance fees be priced? Who funds vertiport creation and 
upgrades? These and other questions depend on what institutions 
regulators choose to use to manage airspace and flight 
management.29 
B. History of Airspace Regulation 
Navigable airspace—which includes the VTOL airspace 
contemplated here30—in the U.S. is quasi-public property and the 
federal government regulates access.31 Some natural resources—
like navigable waters, airspace, and beaches—are customarily held 
in common but, once use increases, require specialized rules from 
the state, and even state control, to improve productive use.32 
 
Demonstrates UAS Command & Control Datalink for NASA UTM, UNMANNED 
SYSTEMS NEWS (Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/ 
2018/04/rockwell-collins-demonstrates-uas-command-control-datalink-for-nasa-
utm/ [https://perma.cc/AB8W-AVWX]; Tiernan Ray, LiDAR! Flying Taxis! Your 
Brain! The Changing Landscapes of CES, BARRON’S (Jan. 16, 2018), 
http://www.barrons.com/amp/articles/lidar-flying-taxis-your-brain-the-
changing-landscape-of-ces-1516145041 [https://perma.cc/Y4BS-SSJA] 
(describing Bell Helicopter plans to deploy “air taxis” by 2025 in cities); Monica 
Alleven, Skyward aims to be the Verizon of drone services, Fierce Wireless (July 
6, 2017), https://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/skyward-aims-to-be-verizon-
drone-services [https://perma.cc/JLG2-N3KH]. 
 29 See E. Tazewell Ellett & Matthew J. Clark, Passengers Without Pilots: 
Toward a Brave New World of Drones, 45 VA. B. ASS’N J. 18, 21 (2018). 
 30 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2012) (“‘Navigable airspace’ means airspace 
above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations . . . , including 
airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of aircraft.”). 
 31 Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (stating “it is well established under federal law that the navigable airspace 
is public property not subject to private ownership.”) (citing 49 U.S.C. 
§ 40103(a)(2) (2000)). 
 32 Richard A. Epstein, How Spontaneous? How Regulated?: The Evolution of 
Property Rights Systems, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2341 (2015). For a discussion of 
nineteenth century doctrines for “inherently public property,” see Carol Rose, The 
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Richard Epstein points out, as an illustration, that by the eighteenth 
century heavily-trafficked river systems in England had developed 
elements of state ownership and control, which increased commerce 
and kept waters navigable.33 For some resources, particularly with 
property necessary for extensive transportation networks, 
government control is necessary to enhance commerce because the 
holdout problems associated with bargaining with innumerable 
property owners tend to prove intractable.34 
As with rivers, airspace developed elements of state control and 
then formal public ownership once aviation made airspace 
“navigable.” The development of hot-air balloons, zeppelins, and 
early flying machines put stress on the ad coelum doctrine35—the 
historic notion that landowners had title to an indefinite height above 
their land—and by 1910 common law courts recognized that 
airspace was not, strictly speaking, private property.36 Courts and 
legislatures found that a navigation servitude was necessary to 
prevent landowners from excluding flights that harmlessly took 
place hundreds or thousands of feet above their property.37 It wasn’t 
 
Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). 
 33 Epstein, supra note 32, at 2356–57 (As river traffic grows heavier, “the water 
system transforms itself from a res commune to one that has strong elements of 
government ownership and control.”); Epstein, supra note 6, at 416 (“It is 
therefore possible to have a system of public ownership without an extensive 
government to administer it. The recognition of the public’s navigation servitude 
in the original position ironically serves to reduce the size of government while 
recognizing the customary public ownership of public goods . . . .”) (italics in 
original). 
 34 Epstein, supra note 6, at 415 (“The risk is that the owner of one segment will 
hold out against all the others, so that bargaining breakdown will prevent any use 
of the river at all for navigation.”). 
 35 BERKELEY REYNOLDS DAVIDS, THE LAW OF MOTOR VEHICLES 292 (1911). 
 36 See Arthur K. Kuhn, The Beginnings of an Aërial Law, 4 AM. J. INTERNAT’L 
L. 109 (1910). The Supreme Court later repudiated the ad coelum doctrine, stating 
that it “has no place in the modern world.” United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 
261 (1946). 
 37 DAVIDS, supra note 35, at 292 (“The air domain of a proprietor may be 
utilized by him to any extent, but in so far as he has not appropriated it, it must be 
deemed to be subject to a servitude of passage by aviators. The case is analogous 
to that of the highway upon which the public have a right of passage, while the 
fee remains in the owner of the abutting land.”) (citation omitted). 
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a large legal leap, then, for some courts to declare navigable airspace 
public property.38 
C. Creation of Property Institutions in the Face of Technology 
Shocks 
To date, low-altitude airspace use is relatively infrequent and 
highly dependent on norms and relatively simple rules of 
operation.39 Episodic use of low-altitude airspace includes 
helicopter trips for tourists, traffic reports, and hospitals in many 
urban areas, as well as general aviation and model airplane flights 
for recreation and hobbyists. As Elinor Ostrom showed, small, 
homogeneous groups like these with regular interaction can create 
enduring, self-governing common pool resource institutions,40 
especially when uses are light. 
Customary arrangements like this, however, are not sustainable 
in the face of a large demand shock for the resource and the presence 
 
 38 Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (stating “it is well established under federal law that the navigable airspace 
is public property not subject to private ownership.”) (citing 49 U.S.C. 
§ 40103(a)(2) (2000)); 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(32) (2012) (“‘Navigable airspace’ 
means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations 
. . . , including airspace needed to ensure safety in the takeoff and landing of 
aircraft.”). 
 39 This is particularly for airspace up to 1200 feet above ground level, which is 
Class G (uncontrolled) airspace in much of the country. See, e.g., Press Release, 
NASA, supra note 5, at 3 (“ATC has no responsibility to provide separation 
services in Class G airspace, rather, manned aircraft cooperatively manage their 
operations based on specified principles of operations.”); Pia Bergqvist, The 
Freedom and Flexibility of Flying VFR, FLYING MAG (Mar. 28, 2016), 
https://www.flyingmag.com/flying-vfr-offers-greater-freedom-and-flexibility 
[https://perma.cc/V677-M5ZT] (discussing the “unstructured nature” of low-
altitude visual flight rules). The FAA has “helicopter highway” routes mapped for 
pilots. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., VFR Raster Charts, 
https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/digital_products/vfr/ 
[https://perma.cc/AG8G-N8N9] (last modified July 19, 2019). Joe Pappalardo, 
Dallas Flyers Club: What Uber’s Flying Taxi Future Feels like, POPULAR 
MECHANICS (May 2, 2018), https://www.popularmechanics.com/flight/ 
a20122610/uber-elevate-flying-taxi-dallas-bell-helicopter/ 
[https://perma.cc/P2VT-NJSV] (But “[i]n many places, using these routes is 
optional . . . .”). 
 40 Ostrom, supra note 14, at 58–89. 
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of many new claimants.41 For land and chattels, as Harold Demsetz 
illustrated, “property rights arise when it becomes economic for 
those affected by externalities to internalize benefits and costs.”42 
Often an exogenous event—like a technology improvement43 or a 
new settlement44—occurs and then property institutions emerge to 
define and parcel out previously common pool resources. 
There are several examples in North American history where 
property rights emerged to coordinate increased use of natural 
resources that were once common pool resources. Native Americans 
around Quebec divided their hunting land around 1700 because of 
increased demand for animal fur.45 Cattlemen fenced off the Great 
Plains as land value increased and the cost of defining property 
rights decreased from 1860 to 1900.46 Property rights in radio 
frequencies developed in the 1920s because of the emergence of 
broadcast radio technology.47 The transformation from common 
pool resource to exclusive use can be costly, but the rise in 
 
 41 Epstein, supra note 4, at 188-89 (“And it follows that intense use creates the 
risk of collision, congestion, confusion, or worse. So eventually somebody says, 
and everyone recognizes, the need to control the commons . . . .”) (citiation 
omitted). Gary D. Libecap, State Regulation of Open-Access, Common-Pool 
Resources, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 545, 547 (Claude 
Menard & Mary M. Shirley, eds., Springer 2008) (“When transaction costs rise 
due to larger numbers of heterogeneous competitors, perhaps attracted by 
exogenous forces, such as price increases or technological changes, that raise the 
value of the asset or that lower the costs of entry, then local, informal 
arrangements, such as community norms may no longer be effective in combating 
the wastes of open access.”). 
 42 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347, 354 (1967). 
 43 See Svetozar Pejovich, Towards an Economic Theory of the Creation and 
Specification of Property Rights, 30 REV. SOC. ECON. 309, 310 (1972). 
 44 See Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study 
of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 170–72 (1975). 
 45 Demsetz, supra note 42, at 351–53. 
 46 Anderson & Hill, supra note 44, at 170–172. 
 47 See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the 
Broadcast Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 143–44 (1990) (“There existed a very 
lively market in broadcast properties, sold with frequency rights attached, early in 
the development of the industry (that is, pre-1927).”); Howard A. Shelanski & 
Peter W. Huber, Administrative Creation of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum, 
41 J.L. & ECON. 581 (1998). 
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productivity increases the value of the underlying resource and 
offsets the costs of defining and enforcing use rights.48 
Airspace, like spectrum, navigable rivers, certain oil reserves, 
and timber lands, is a valuable resource managed on behalf of the 
public by the State. Property institutions cannot develop via custom 
or natural law for rationing public resources and the state must 
introduce property institutions to ensure productive use.49 There are 
two basic paradigms for use of publicly-owned resource use: open 
access and exclusive use.50 Open access means anyone can use the 
resource without limit.51 Public sidewalks for pedestrians and open 
access publications are examples.52 Exclusive use means legal 
control or ownership by a sole party. Real estate and licensed 
spectrum are examples.53 
Publicly-controlled resources vary immensely in their 
character—taxi medallions, public parks, navigable waters, radio 
spectrum, game animals—and a resource use paradigm, once 
selected de jure, requires iteration and modification to ensure 
productive use.54 Elinor Ostrom’s work on resource management 
suggests that “getting the institutions right” is a “difficult, time-
consuming, conflict-invoking process.”55 “The trick” for the state, 
 
 48 Demsetz, supra note 42, at 354 (“I have argued that property rights arise 
when it becomes economic for those affected by externalities to internalize the 
benefits and costs.”). 
 49 Epstein, supra note 32, at 2356–57 (As river traffic grows heavier, “the water 
system transforms itself from a res commune to one that has strong elements of 
government ownership and control.”). 
 50 Richard Epstein, Property Rights in Water, Spectrum, and Minerals, 86 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 389, 392 (2015). 
 51 James A. Swaney, Common Property, Reciprocity, and Community, 24 J. OF 
ECON. ISSUES 451, 451–53 (1990). 
 52 See, e.g., Licenses and Open Access, CORNELL COPYRIGHT INFORMATION 
CENTER, https://copyright.cornell.edu/license_OA [https://perma.cc/X4GN-
KA57] (stating open access “refers to freely available, digital, online 
information”). 
 53 See Thomas W. Hazlett & Matthew L. Spitzer, Advanced Wireless 
Technologies and Public Policy, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 595, 603–04 (2006) 
(describing licensed spectrum). 
 54 Epstein, supra note 50. 
 55 Ostrom, supra note 14, at 14. 
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Epstein notes, “is to pick the right initial point to reduce the stress 
on making these further adjustments.”56 
II. AIRSPACE AS A REGULATED COMMONS 
It is common, as explained below, for the government to de-
conflict a valuable public resource by auctioning geographic, 
exclusive assignments. An alternative way to ration and de-conflict 
a federally-controlled resource is for the government to try to 
preserve a semblance of open access. To prevent a tragedy of the 
commons,57 rationing and de-confliction is achieved via regulation 
of equipment, technologies, and business models—a regulated 
commons.58 
This regulated commons model for VTOL and drone airspace is 
currently being explored in the U.S.59 A regulated commons regime 
is seen in certain bands of spectrum60 and for traditional aviation. A 
central administrator, which can be public or private, assigns access 
to the resource, often in response to real time demands. Regulators 
 
 56 Epstein, supra note 50. 
 57 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
 58 More precisely, a regulated common pool resource. Fisheries are another 
example of a regulated common pool resource. See Carsten L. Jensen, Reduction 
of the fishing capacity in ‘common pool’ fisheries, 26 MARINE POL’Y 155 (2002). 
 59 See NASA, supra note 3. The NASA UTM plans focus on management of 
drone operations, but experts expect that UTM will be incorporate VTOLs as the 
industry develops. See Ellett & Clark, supra note 29. Lilium, a VTOL aircraft 
company, similarly “is advocating an open system of VTOL landing pads, similar 
to public roads or airports today.” Elan Head, Lilium bets on regional mobility, 
EVTOL MAGAZINE (Sept. 11, 2019), https://evtol.com/features/lilium-bets-on-
regional-mobility/ [https://perma.cc/E4SX-2TUM]. 
 60 In many ways, the regulated commons approach for VTOL resembles the 
“spectrum commons” movement that was in vogue over a decade ago. See, e.g., 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 76 (2002). The regulated sharing of 
valuable “unlicensed” spectrum appears to have stalled because of the difficulty 
and inefficiency, anticipated by scholars like Jerry Brito and Thomas Hazlett. 
Jerry Brito, The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice, 2007 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (2007); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited 
Bandwidth Myth, The Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald 
Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 335, 495 (2001) (“‘Open access’ is not truly open under the FCC’s 
unlicensed rules. Equipment regulation is used to prevent over-grazing.”). 
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envision that VTOL (and drone) airspace management should 
resemble traditional airspace management in several key ways.61 
Namely, there will be a single UTM system (or a few systems that 
interoperate on regulated terms).62 As NASA has said, “[UTM] is a 
community-based traffic management system, where . . . [o]perators 
share their flight intent with each other and coordinate to de-conflict 
and safely separate trajectories.” 63 
With a regulated commons model, airspace and terminal 
management and de-confliction would take place, as with traditional 
air transportation, on an inter-firm basis.64 Routes and vertiports, as 
with the commercial airline industry, will not be exclusive, they will 
be shared regularly every day.65 In this scenario, VTOL and drone 
operators will input prospective flights into the UTM system and 
regulator-approved UTM system operators will use inputted data in 
real time to share the skies and schedule VTOL flights.66 Experts 
anticipate that, with this model, because inter-firm sharing of the 
airspace is required, VTOLs and drones will need mandated and 
interoperable technologies like reliance on detect-and-avoid 
capabilities, ADS-B, airborne radar, or ground-based radar.67 
III. PROBLEMS WITH A REGULATED COMMONS 
This regulated commons regime—withholding geographic 
exclusivity and delegating VTOL (and drone) traffic management 
 
 61 See NASA, supra note 3, at 4. 
 62 Id. (“The term ‘UTM’ refers to a set of federated services and an all-
encompassing framework for managing multiple UAS operations.”). 
 63 Id. at 4–5. 
 64 Id. at 5. 
 65 Id. at 12. 
 66 One possibility is that low-altitude airspace is “parcel-ized” by private UTM 
systems. Uber has proposed a “dynamic skylane network” for VTOL traffic. Uber, 
supra note 2, at 3:56:30. Dynamic skylane networks are virtual lanes in the sky 
that are dynamically adjusted. Id. These can be monitored to measure 
conformance within the lane. Id. The difference with the earlier auction and 
exclusive-use proposal is that there would be inter-firm sharing of the dynamic 
skylane parcels. 
 67 THE ASPEN INST., RETHINKING INSTITUTIONS OF SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT 
14 (2018). 
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to a single, interconnected UTM system—has foreseeable 
challenges. 
A. Over-regulation and Underutilization of Airspace 
The primary problem with the regulated commons approach is 
that innovators might deliver on their promise of mass air taxi 
service and the planned UTM system cannot handle the traffic. As 
NASA points out in one of its UTM reports, its regulated commons 
approach may suffice with modest levels of low-altitude air traffic: 
“[i]n airspace with moderate airspace demand, equitable access is 
achieved through Operator collaboration, efficient airspace design, 
and FAA rules.”68 However, the report adds, “if demand for a 
volume of airspace becomes too great to maintain safety of flight, or 
support all types of operations, the FAA may be required to provide 
demand management of access, but only for that purpose.”69 
The latter sentence raises alarm bells because, should the 
industry develop into a mass market, regulators will be forced to 
regularly referee competition for the most valuable urban airspace. 
Recall that companies are anticipating that many VTOL vertiports 
will be serving hundreds of landings per hour.70 Consider the nature 
of transportation networks, which tend to cluster into a hierarchy of 
congested hubs,71 the “lumpy” nature of urban travel (with peaks 
during commutes and special events), and the inevitability of bad 
weather, which requires re-scheduling. Almost certainly, under the 
current UTM plans, regulators will regularly be “providing demand 
management for airspace access” for valuable urban aerial corridors. 
In spectrum72 and aviation policy, a regulated commons with a 
private administrator requires intensive certification regulations and 
 
 68 NASA, supra note 3, at 25 (emphasis added). 
 69 Id. 
 70  “In this 40-node network [in the Los Angeles region], about 80% of the 
nodes require a throughput of about 400 to 800 landings per hour.” Uber, supra 
note 2, at 59:57. 
 71 Liang Zhao et al., Onset of traffic congestion in complex networks, 71 
PHYSICAL REV. 1, 1 (2005). 
 72 Where the regulators have a regulated commons for spectrum resources, they 
create very strict limits in order to prevent overuse or congestion. See, for 
instance, power limits and equipment rules on Part 15 and “unlicensed” devices. 
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often suffers from the same problems as command-and-control, 
including economic distortions and the endless refereeing of 
commercial disputes. This need to intervene, to set ad hoc rules, and 
proscribe certain business models in a regulated commons can 
create endemic underuse of the resource.73 
For example, in 1968, nearly one-third of peak-time New York 
City air traffic—the busiest region in the US—was general aviation 
(that is, small, personal) aircraft.74 To combat severe congestion, 
local authorities raised minimum landing fees by a mere $25 (1968 
dollars) on sub 25-seat aircraft.75 General aviation traffic at peak 
times immediately fell over 30%76—suggesting that a massive 
amount of pre-July 1968 air traffic in the region was low-value. The 
share of aircraft delayed by 30 or more minutes fell by half, from 
17% of flights to about 8%.77 
Even if regulators could determine the “best” UTM vendors, 
urban airspace will tend towards underutilization. Regulators are the 
only party that can prevent the tragedy of the commons; the 
asymmetry towards underutilization arises because aviation 
regulators have acute incentive to prevent overuse, since overuse 
creates safety hazards. However, as the 1960s experience with New 
York airports shows, regulators have a relatively weak incentive to 
 
See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 242, 262 
(2005); Brito, supra note 60 (noting that “[i]f government is to assure that 
technologies are ‘properly certified’ it must first establish what is proper 
certification. It will do this using the tools at its disposal—through a political 
regulatory process and without the benefit of the dynamic feedback a market 
could provide.”); Thomas W. Hazlett & Brent Skorup, Tragedy of the Regulatory 
Commons: LightSquared and the Missing Spectrum Rights, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 1, 15 (2014) (“The “unlicensed spectrum” is governed by technical and 
behavioral rules (including power limits) established by regulators.”). 
 73 See Hazlett & Skorup, supra note 72, at 13–15. 
 74 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., AIRPORT QUOTAS AND PEAK HOUR PRICING: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE, REP. NO. FAA-AVP-775 55-56 Table 9, (1976). 
 75 Similarly, before being overturned, Logan Airport raised fees on small 
aircraft in the 1980s in order to lessen congestion. Daniel R. Polsby, Airport 
Pricing of Takeoff and Landing Slots: An Economic Critique of Federal 
Regulatory Policy, 89 CAL. L. REV. 779, 809 (2001). The scheme worked and 
general aviation traffic fell by about one-third. Id. At 809. 
 76 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 74, at 55 Table 8. 
 77 Id. at 57 Table 10. 
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maximize productive use of urban airspace. As explained next, the 
tools regulators are considering to promote efficient use of low-
altitude airspace have significant tradeoffs. 
B. Mandated Interoperability Creates Technology Lock-in 
A centralized UTM system, even if privately operated, will 
require significant regulatory oversight to protect competition, 
regulate pricing, and ensure interoperability between UTM 
components.78 A unified UTM system cannot have competing 
operators, so UTM will either be managed by a sole operator or will 
need to interoperate on regulated terms with other service providers. 
As a Wired magazine story put it, “flying cars aren’t like 
smartphones; you can’t let competing tech and protocols coexist 
while the market figures it out. Flying cars would require a single 
operating system—and therefore either a whole lot of cooperation 
between competing companies or a firm grip by the iron hand of 
regulators.” 79 
There are substantial technical obstacles to a unified, 
interoperable UTM system.80 “Interoperability” in technology has 
no agreed-upon meaning, carries immense tradeoffs and it can be 
quite complex to define and enforce compliance.81 A major risk of 
mandated UTM interoperability is technology lock-in—the 
 
 78 In many ways, the regulated commons approach for VTOL resembles the 
“spectrum commons” movement that was in vogue over a decade ago. See LESSIG, 
supra note 60. 
 79 Alex Davies, Kitty Hawk, Flying Cars, and the Challenges of ‘Going 3d’, 
WIRED (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/future-of-transportation-
kitty-hawk-self-flying-cars/ [https://perma.cc/7AHV-C7XH]. 
 80 Behind the Scenes of Drone Integration: Managing Traffic in the Sky, VA. 
TECH. NEWS (May 21, 2018), https://vtnews.vt.edu/articles/2018/05/ictas-
nasautm2018.html [https://perma.cc/UEG6-FKPC] (“Balancing the requirements 
of different aircraft, on different missions, using different software, and doing as 
much of it as possible automatically, is a complicated equation.”) (quoting a chief 
engineer working on a UTM system). 
 81 As two scholars noted on the subject, “[t]he problems of too much 
interconnectivity present enormous challenges both for organizations and for 
society at large.” JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND 
PERILS OF HIGHLY INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 2 (2012). Therefore, “most of the 
specifics of how to bring interop about [must] be determined on a case-by-case 
basis.” Id. at 17. 
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dominance of an established, but inferior, technology because of 
reliance interests long after improved replacement technologies 
have developed.82 John Palfrey and Urs Gasser have studied 
interoperability and note, “[t]his problem of lock-in is one of the 
core puzzles of interoperability . . . .”83 As a result, the list of failed 
or inordinately costly regulator choices—typically made after years 
of fact-finding and research—for interoperable technology elements 
is long.84 
UTM interoperability also creates large systematic risk should 
the UTM operator encounter technical obsolescence or financial 
troubles. For Palfrey and Gasser, air traffic control stands out for its 
drawbacks, and UTM carries much of the same inherent rigidity as 
traditional air traffic management. Researchers note how difficult it 
is to integrate “plainly superior, technologies” like GPS into air 
 
 82 W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In 
by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 126 (1989) (describing examples “where 
an early-established technology becomes dominant, so that later, superior 
alternatives cannot gain a footing”). 
 83 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 81, at 107. 
 84 See, e.g., SOCIETY OF CABLE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERS, 
ANSI/SCTE 28 2007 (2007), https://law.resource.org/pub/us/cfr/ibr/005/ 
scte.28.2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ63-U8CV]; see also, Todd Spangler, FCC 
Douses FireWire Requirement for Set-Tops With IP, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (June 
21, 2010) http://www.multichannel.com/news/news/fcc-douses-firewire-
requirement-set-tops-ip/378067 [https://perma.cc/ZV7R-R2VL] (explaining that 
this mandated technology, marketed as “FireWire,” became a costly 
“technological bridge to nowhere” as the industry moved to Internet Protocol-
based standards); see generally, Nate Anderson, FCC admits CableCARD a 
failure, vows to try something else, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 2009) 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/12/fcc-admits-cablecard-a-failure-
vows-to-try-something-else/ [https://perma.cc/YVH8-542L] (discussing that the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) established IEEE 1394 
interfaces for media cables. This standard, marketed as CableCARD, failed 
commercially despite government mandates); see also National Highway and 
Transportation Administration, Brent Skorup Comment on the Proposed Vehicle-
to-Vehicle Technology Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Dkt. No. 
NHTSA-2016-0126 (Apr. 12, 2017) https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/ 
skorup-v2v-technologies-pic-v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FA7B-5K65] 
(commenting that the IEEE 802.11p communications standard for vehicle-to-
anything (V2X) communications has also failed to gain traction despite two 
decades of government support). 
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traffic management.85 This difficulty to improve traditional air 
traffic management is because of “the deeply rooted interoperability 
of the current system.”86 Palfrey and Gasser’s conclusion has 
sobering implications for UTM plans: “it is very hard to envision 
what a successful interoperability strategy for the next generation of 
air traffic control systems will or should look like, because there are 
so many stakeholders around the world and so many different 
technologies involved.” 87 
A centralized, shared UTM system that many parties rely on 
makes later modifications very difficult since it increases the 
number of parties who have veto power over changes to the 
system.88 
C. Competitive Entry Problems and an Unwarranted First-Mover 
Advantage 
A regulated commons model offers a large first-mover 
advantage that is difficult to reverse. As mentioned, several 
companies anticipate providing UTM or UTM components.89 
Presumably every prospective UTM operator likewise desires to be 
the exclusive UTM operator approved by regulators and needs 
extensive control of all VTOL aircraft. As one UTM contender has 
said, “[w]e must have direct operational control over every active 
element in our network,” have authority to schedule in real-time 
every aircraft, and be the primary liaison with the FAA.90 It’s 
 
 85 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 81, at 43–44. (explaining that technology 
exists to reduce separation times, but because of the free-rider problem, airlines 
have declined to make the necessary equipment installations); see also, MICHAEL 
BALL ET AL., AUCTIONS FOR THE SAFE, EFFICIENT AND EQUITABLE ALLOCATION 
OF AIRSPACE SYSTEM RESOURCES, 960 (Peter Cramton et al., eds, MIT Press 
2006). 
 86 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 81, at 107. 
 87 Id. at 261. 
 88 Id. at 107. 
 89 See Press Release, NASA, supra note 5 (reporting that some plan to manage 
drones, some plan to manage VTOLs, and some plan to manage both types of 
services); see also, Geiver, supra note 28; Ball, supra note 28. 
 90 Uber, supra note 2 (referring to Uber Elevate Cloud Services). 
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unclear, at present, which company or companies will manage low-
altitude airspace and on what terms.91 
New users to shared, congested airspace and terminals will be 
under immense pressure to operate on a no-interference basis, if 
permitted to operate at all, even if they offer more efficient 
operations or better technology.92 VTOL aircraft manufacturers like 
Bell anticipate that service will be predetermined routes between 
vertiports,93 which means that first-movers will have an incentive to 
capture the popular, high-revenue routes as early as is feasible.94 
The history of airport slot allocation and spectrum access is 
instructive.95 The lesson from aviation history is that once the 
 
 91 ELLETT & CLARK, supra note 29. 
 92 So, for instance, when new services are deployed in a regulated commons, 
“unlicensed spectrum,” existing operators strenuously object to and lobby against 
newcomers. FCC rules stating that existing users in unlicensed bands “shall not 
be deemed to have any vested or recognizable right to continued use of any given 
frequency” are worth little if politically powerful incumbents resist. 47 C.F.R. 
§ 18.111. See Brent Skorup, Spectrum NIMBYs and the Return of FCC Beauty 
Contests?, TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (July 23, 2015), 
https://techliberation.com/2015/07/23/spectrum-nimbys-and-the-return-of-fcc-
beauty-contests/ [https://perma.cc/429W-WQFE]; Brito, supra note 60 
(“Predictably, Cisco, 3Com, Apple, and other Wi-Fi backers waged a contentious 
regulatory war against the rule change claiming that the new HomeRF technology 
would interfere with Wi-Fi transmissions.”). 
 93 Urban Air Mobility Conference, CEO Mitch Snyder Keynote, YOUTUBE 
(Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZojkpfHF0Fw 
[https://perma.cc/TZ43-PFBR] (“As far as the flight control system goes we will 
use predetermined paths to move from vertiport to vertiport.”). 
 94 Analysts at McKinsey have noted the first-mover advantage phenomenon in 
this market. Robin Riedel & Shivika Sahdev, Taxiing for takeoff: The flying cab 
in your future, MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 2019), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20190109164929/https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-
logistics/our-insights/taxiing-for-takeoff-the-flying-cab-in-your-future 
[https://perma.cc/UX4K-TLZD] (“It is likely that first movers will have an 
advantage by securing the most attractive sites along high-traffic routes.”). 
 95 It’s recognized today in traditional aviation that “arrival and departure slots 
at certain critical airports [are] commodities that have substantial intrinsic value.” 
COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS 2 (Peter Cramton, Yoav Shaham & Richard 
Steinberg, eds., 2006). BALL ET AL., supra note 85, at 995. The Bush DOT 
proposed to auction a few slots at congested New York-area airports. See Justin 
Baer, US presses on with NY airport slot sales, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008. 
The proposal faced immense legal and political resistance and was dropped when 
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centralized allocation apparatus is in place it is very difficult to 
dislodge in order to permit market allocation of a federal resource.96 
Incumbents and interested parties resist later additions of exclusive 
use because of status quo inertia or because they believe (often 
sensibly) they can gain cheaper rights to public assets via 
manipulation of the administrative assignment of rights.97 
IV. PROPOSAL: AUCTION AIRSPACE 
To avoid the anticompetitive effects and technology lock-in that 
would come from common pool airspace management and 
government-selected UTM systems, the federal government should 
consider airspace auctions. The auction of low-altitude airspace 
should be explored promptly because it is very difficult to reverse 
policy once VTOL operators squat on high-revenue routes and are 
accustomed to regulated commons access. These auctions would 
require the FAA to define geographic tracts of low-altitude airspace 
 
the Obama administration took over. Michael E. Levine, Airport Congestion: 
When Theory Meets Reality, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 68 (2009). New York Senator 
Chuck Schumer called it a “goofy, harebrained scheme.” Matthew L. Wald, 
Democrats Vow to Block Airport-Slot Sale, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2008) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/19/nyregion/19airports.html 
[https://perma.cc/B4UH-W9R6]. For spectrum history, see Thomas W. Hazlett, 
Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License 
Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529 (1998). 
 96 See DJ Gribbin et al., supra note 10, at 22–23, 47. The slot rules “limit[ed] 
competition and new entrants, [had] an inability to ensure efficient utilization of 
slots, and [] encouraged hoarding of slots.”; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
Airline Competition: Industry Operating and Marketing Practices Limit Market 
Entry, GAO/RCED-90-147 (Aug. 29, 1990) https://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
150/149541.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7U4-3974]. 
 97 See Valeen Afualo & John McMillan, Auctions of Rights to Public Property, 
in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter 
Newman ed., 1996). See also FEDERAL AVIATION ADMIN., Airport Quotas and 
Peak Hour Pricing: Theory and Practice 83, Rep. No. FAA-AVP-775 (May 1976), 
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/67990/FTL_R_1976_01 
.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/2Z7S-LBKA]. 
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and to auction off exclusive usufruct rights98 to use that airspace.99 
To promote competition in local markets, airspace tracts could be 
divided not simply by geography, but by altitude, like a layer cake.100 
Within the designated airspace tracts and corridors purchased 
and combined, private operators would have freedom to select flight 
paths, terminal locations, flight speed, and business model. The 
federal government might regulate factors like separation 
minimums and emergency capabilities but could delegate most 
technology and operational choices to the licensees. 
The number of financially viable vertiports in a metropolitan 
area will be limited. Zoning, noise regulations, prevailing wind 
direction, population density, and existing transportation 
infrastructure will all be considerations for vertiport placement. 
Given this scarcity, aerial corridors connecting likely vertiport 
locations—central business district to major airport, for instance—
are a sensible airspace tract configuration. 
Aerial corridors are not unheard of in traditional aviation, though 
they are typically shared between airlines and they are not 
auctioned. “Victor” airways in the U.S., for instance, are aerial 
corridors crisscrossing the U.S. about three miles tall and nine miles 
wide, further subdivided horizontally.101 The air traffic system 
 
 98 “Usufruct” derives from Roman law and literally means the right to use land 
and collect the fruits of the land. The basic rule for usufruct is that the possessor 
of the right may use her interest as she pleases so long as she does not damage the 
owner’s—here, the public—reversionary interest. The possessor is not allowed to 
sell the usufruct right without consent of the owner. See Epstein, supra note 50, 
at 396. 
 99 Some effort might be made to compensate “displaced” air users, like 
helicopter tourism businesses and general aircraft airports. Resistance is to be 
expected but displacement will likely occur whatever regulatory system for 
VTOL is chosen. 
 100 Airspace below 200 feet—and airspace subjacent to high-rise buildings—is 
needed for terminal access. Terminal access would require real property 
acquisitions and compliance with local laws and is outside the purposes of this 
paper. 
 101 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN, Instrument Procedures Handbook, Ch. 2 2–2, 
FAA-H-8083-16B (2017), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/ 
handbooks_manuals/aviation/instrument_procedures_handbook/media/faa-h-
8083-16b.pdf [https://perma.cc/LWP3-Y84W] (“Airways can be thought of as 
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operator in the U.K. similarly has an aerial highway system 
connecting commercial airports within the country.102 These airways 
are typically three and a half miles tall and ten miles wide with 
horizontal subdivisions.103 
It is impossible to determine a priori what the precise, “proper” 
VTOL airspace tract size or corridor size but a few principles can be 
deduced to guide regulators in determining appropriate size. A 
single airspace tract license, or only a handful, in a metropolitan area 
creates a monopolization problem and should be avoided. On the 
other extreme, a tract size following the borders of a Census block—
there are over eleven million in the U.S.—would likely overwhelm 
the government with a massive auction and create inefficient 
fragmentation for operators to recombine. 
Given the local nature of urban eVTOL transportation, areas 
somewhat larger than Census tracts—there are about 66,000 Census 
tracts across the U.S. and are about neighborhood size in urban 
areas—is a good starting point. Highly-trafficked urban airspace 
parcels should probably be smaller sizes, similar to how offshore oil 
leases104 and spectrum licenses105 are sized, where more valuable 
areas have smaller sizes. In other contexts, regulators consult with 
 
three-dimensional highways for aircraft. In most land areas of the world, aircraft 
are required to fly airways between the departure and destination airports.”). 
 102 NAT’L AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES, What We Do, https://www.nats.aero/about-
us/what-we-do/atc-explained/ [https://perma.cc/QYG9-FK2W]. 
 103 Id. 
 104 PETER CRAMTON, HOW BEST TO AUCTION NATURAL RESOURCES 4 (May 21, 
2009), http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2005-2009/cramton-auctioning-
natural-resources.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6FL-CAQK]. See BUREAU OF OCEAN 
ENERGY MGM’T, COMBINED LEASING REPORT AS OF MAY 1, 2018, 5 (2018) 
https://www.boem.gov/2018-annual-lease-stats/ [https://perma.cc/JRM7-BCT7]. 
The DOI’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management offers nearly 60,000 lease 
blocks covering over 300 million acres in the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of 
Mexico. Block size varies but are generally 9 square miles. Id. 
 105 FED. COMMUNICATION COMM’N, CELLULAR MARKET AREAS (CMAS), 
https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/wireless/auctions/data/maps/CMA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/67Z3-S6JF]. See Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter, & Vernon 
Smith, Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase, 54 J.L. & 
ECON. S125, S158–60 Appendix (2011). The FCC has auctioned licenses for 
cellular services for twenty years and license size tends to hover between 400 and 
1000 license areas nationwide. Id. 
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industry and experts about what geographic tract size is practicable 
and output-maximizing.106 
New legislation would be useful to signal the change in national 
policy but the FAA may not require new legislation to auction 
VTOL airspace. The FAA has broad statutory authority to “assign 
. . . the use of the navigable airspace under such terms, conditions, 
and limitations as [it] may deem necessary in order to insure the 
safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of such airspace.”107 
Further, the FAA has authority to lease any interest in property, 
including airspace, for “adequate compensation”108 and the 
Secretary of Transportation is instructed by statute to “plac[e] 
maximum reliance on competitive market forces.”109 While 
exclusive rights to air navigation facilities are prohibited when the 
facility has received federal funds,110 privately-funded facilities can 
be exclusively assigned. 
Revenue generation from public assets should not dominate 
airspace auction priorities but it is a relevant factor because public 
trustees like the FAA have a duty to recover fair value.111 Revenues 
from auction or leasing of public assets can be substantial. For 
instance, offshore oil auctions have raised over $280 billion from 
bonus bids and over $220 billion in government royalties (2015 
dollars).112 Government receipts from spectrum auctions have 
 
 106 CRAMTON, supra note 104. I leave it to other commentators to determine 
how revenue is optimally collected, whether royalties, profit-share, or other 
mechanism, as well as the auction format. 
 107 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2006) (originally enacted as Pub, L, No, 85-726, 72 Stat, 
731 (1958)). 
 108 Air Traffic Management System Performance Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 40110(a)(3) (Supp.V 2017) (giving the FAA express authority to lease property 
to others. FAA Final Rule, Congestion and Delay Reduction at Chicago O’Hare 
International Airport, 71 Fed. Reg. at 51, 360, 51, 362–63. 
 109 49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(6) (2012). 
 110 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e) (2012). 
 111 See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 112 CRAMTON, supra note 104, at 9. Winning bids from all federal lease sales 
for oil and gas extraction from 1954 to 2008 was around $75 billion. See also 
DAVID PAUL NORDT, A STUDY OF STRATEGIES FOR OIL AND GAS AUCTIONS 2, 
(August 2000) (dissertation, Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M 
University). 
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grossed over $100 billion (2015 dollars) since 1994.113 These values 
are likely dwarfed by the consumer surplus derived from the 
commercial operations.114 
A. VTOL Airspace Resembles Other Federal Assets that are 
Auctioned 
Low-altitude airspace is like many valuable, publicly-owned 
natural resources where the federal government stands in as a public 
trustee.115 Public trusteeship generally means government 
disposition and leasing to private actors to process is permitted so 
long as fair value is received in exchange.116 Accordingly, under 
public trustee theory, there is a presumption that the state should not 
grant access to a publicly-owned resource like navigable airspace 
for free. 
For federal resources where widespread public access and use 
cannot feasibly occur, long-term leases for geographic-based tracts 
works well.117 The federal government operates as a public trustee 
for several types of natural resources and for decades—in order to 
 
 113 BRENT SKORUP, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, THE 
IMPORTANCE OF SPECTRUM ACCESS TO THE FUTURE OF INNOVATION 1 (Dec. 
2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/skorup-spectrum-access-future-
innovation-mop-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ3F-6CJ6]. 
 114 Hazlett, supra note 72, at 251 (“The capitalized social value of [cellular] 
bandwidth [in 2004] likely exceeds $1.6 trillion . . . .”). 
 115 For a discussion of the public trust doctrine, see Epstein, supra note 6. “The 
public trust doctrine is the mirror image of the eminent domain clause. Both are 
designed to place limitations upon the power of legislature to divert property, 
whether held privately or in common . . . .” Id. at 426. Joseph Sax, The Public 
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 
MICH. L. REV. 471, 556 (1970) (“It is clear that the judicial techniques developed 
in public trust cases need not be limited either to these few conventional interests 
[e.g. rivers, streams or parklands] or to questions of disposition of public 
properties.”). 
 116 See Walter J. Mead, Natural Resource Disposal Policy—Oral Auction 
Versus Sealed Bids, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 194 (1967); see also Epstein, supra 
note 32, at 2358. 
 117 Geographic-based tracts, it might be said, are an effective market boundary 
for these federal resources. For a discussion of effective and ineffective market 
boundaries, see Gerald Faulhaber, Policy-induced competition: the 
telecommunications experiments, 15 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 73 (2003). 
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de-conflict competing demands for resources—has delimited 
geographic parcels and auctioned usufruct rights and licenses to 
those assets.118 This includes the sale and auction of grazing rights 
and “stumpage” rights on public lands,119 the right to construct radio 
frequency transmitters like cellular facilities,120 offshore wind 
energy collection locations,121 coal extraction on federal lands,122 oil 
retrieval rights in petroleum basins,123 and mineral extraction 
rights.124 
VTOL airspace resembles assets like radio spectrum and 
offshore energy locations—where tract auctions work well—more 
than it does a common pool resource like rivers or public roads—
where tract auctions do not work well. At a glance, VTOL airspace 
appears to resemble public roadways and navigable rivers—
transportation networks with ancient open access or regulated 
commons rules. Public roads and navigable waters, after all, allow 
significant economic activity and are not auctioned by tracts. 
 
 118 See Vernon L. Smith, On Divestiture and the Creation of Property Rights in 
Public Lands, 2 CATO J. 663 (1982); Mead, supra note 116. 
 119 About 76% of state timber volume offered for sale is sold via auction. Ross 
Brown et al., Assessing State Timber Sale Policies, Programs and Stumpage Price 
Drivers, Staff Paper Series No. 209, Department of Forest Resources, U. Minn. 
(May 2010), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d71a/622f1af685ec 
5792a13db6c23c98b9391599.pdf [https://perma.cc/96TB-J4R4]. 
 120 Shelanski & Huber, supra note 47. 
 121 Adam Johnston, US Atlantic Offshore Wind Energy Bidding Proposal 
Announced by Obama Administration, CLEANTECHNICA (Dec. 3, 2012), 
https://cleantechnica.com/2012/12/03/us-atlantic-offshore-wind-farms-open-
business/ [https://perma.cc/23AQ-CW6E]. 
 122 Obama White House, THE ECONOMICS OF COAL LEASING ON FEDERAL 
LANDS: ENSURING A FAIR RETURN TO TAXPAYERS 6, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160622_ce
a_coal_leasing.pdf%22%22 [https://perma.cc/Q9WH-7UZ7] (“In 2015, roughly 
40 percent of coal produced in the United States was extracted from Federal lands 
. . . .”). 
 123 A market for petroleum basins, divided into geographic parcels, developed 
because of increased demand for oil. See S. Scott Gaille, Allocation of 
International Petroleum Licenses to National Oil Companies: Insights from the 
Coase Theorem, 31 ENERGY L.J. 111, 116 (2010). 
 124 Afualo & McMillan, supra note 97. 
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However, airspace above 200 feet differs from roadways and 
navigable rivers in crucial ways.125 
First, VTOL airspace more closely resembles spectrum rights or 
oil drilling rights in that “the resource cannot exist until the 
technology is created.”126 Use of road and river travel “rights,” in 
contrast, do not require the technology or large investments that 
airspace use or drilling require. This fact relates to the second 
difference: roads and rivers have been actually accessed by the 
public for centuries—“propertization” of roads and rivers would be 
socially disruptive and nearly impossible to enforce.127 VTOL 
airspace, on the other hand, is fairly “clean” and therefore enforcing 
exclusivity is much less socially disruptive than, say, introducing 
route exclusivity as a default rule for road or river travel. 
The airspace discussed here, then, has access properties more 
closely resembling spectrum and offshore oil basins, resources 
which are typically demarcated via geographic tracts and auctioned, 
not allocated on open access principles like sidewalks, rivers, and 
roadways. There is not a longstanding custom of the public 
accessing any of these “licensed property” resources because it 
requires significant technological know-how and investment to 
build and operate a VTOL, an offshore drilling site, or a cellular or 
broadcast transmission tower. 
 
 125 Airspace below 200 feet is more easily accessed by the public and open 
access regimes might be more appropriate for drones below 200 feet. 
 126 Epstein, supra note 4, at 212. 
 127 Epstein, supra note 6, at 417 (“[I]t is hardly conceivable to think of effective 
ways to prevent persons on the river from using it for these purposes [like fishing 
and bathing] . . . . It is very difficult to exclude persons from using navigable 
waters when they cannot be excluded from gaining access to it.”). This reasoning 
suggests that “drone airspace,” below 200 feet or so, might not be amenable to 
exclusive use and auction. This is particularly true once you factor in the difficult 
problems surrounding where “navigable airspace” ends and “real estate”—the 
height to where landowners can build—begins. 
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B. For a New Resource, Regulators Need to Introduce Auctions 
Early 
One lesson from public resources management literature is that 
auctions work best for new or relatively unused resources.128 First, 
it’s difficult for regulators to embrace auctions later when asset 
values are higher because auctions empower market processes, often 
at the cost of regulator and insiders’ preferences, to determine the 
assignment of valuable public property.129 Second, it is far easier to 
introduce property institutions at the start, when the resource is 
lightly used, than to create a regulated commons and then reverse 
policy. 
Economist Gary D. Libecap evaluated natural resources that 
were once regulated as a common pool resource but, later, regulators 
attempted and only somewhat successfully introduced exclusive 
use.130 For many common pool resources, he concluded, lawmakers 
attempt to inject property rights institutions only after conditions 
have deteriorated from overuse.131 At that point, it was often too late 
for effective use of exclusive-use property institutions.132 Aviation 
provides a good example of the difficulty of reforming pricing rules 
once services are being supplied. Airport congestion fees—which 
have been proposed for decades and have theoretical support—are 
 
 128 Gary D. Libecap, Assigning Property Rights in the Common Pool: 
Implications for the Prevalence of First-Possession Rules for ITQs in Fisheries, 
22 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 407, 408–413 (2007) (noting that “[w]hen there are 
no incumbents and rights are distributed by the state to a new, valuable resource 
and transaction costs of subsequent exchange are high, then auction is optimal. It 
directs the resource to those who will maximize its value and the resource rents 
can be secured by the state . . . .”). It was also very difficult to introduce markets 
in airline terminals. Levine, supra note 95. 
 129 Afualo & McMillan, supra note 97. It is routine today to auction spectrum 
but there was tremendous FCC resistance for decades, in part because regulators 
had long tied spectrum assignment to the regulators’ social goals, like local 
broadcast news and children’s programming. See Hazlett, supra note 95. 
 130 Libecap, supra note 128. 
 131 Id. at 411 (noting that “formal property rights often are not implemented [by 
the state] until either resource values are very high (the rental losses of open access 
or central regulation are very large) or until late in the use of a resource when the 
open-access losses have largely been borne and the stock is close to depletion. At 
that time, the benefits of property rights become clearer.”). 
 132 Id. 
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strongly resisted by air transport operators and thus have gained 
little traction.133 
V. THE BENEFITS OF AIRSPACE AUCTIONS OVER 
REGULATED COMMONS AIRSPACE 
Exclusive-use auction assignment and flexible-use rules fill 
several important needs.134 For the following reasons, exclusive 
use—intra-firm optimization within auctioned tracts—may generate 
more VTOL and delivery services more quickly than inter-firm 
sharing of airspace and terminals. In particular, an exclusive-use 
regime for airspace allocation may, relative to regulated commons 
access to airspace and terminals, reduce costly conflicts over 
resource use and allow for more dynamic efficiencies. 
First, auctions and flexible-use rules allow operator autonomy 
within a distributed system. A federated system offers significant 
dynamic efficiency upside. The current regulatory proposals for an 
interoperable network like UTM would likely provide system 
uniformity at a large cost to innovation and the introduction of better 
aircraft and component systems.135 As Palfrey and Gasser noted in 
their research on the subject, the “deeply rooted interoperability” of 
the traditional airspace system accounts for the difficulty in updating 
the system, “even when there are good reasons for doing so.”136 
Airspace tract licenses, similar to spectrum licenses and unlike the 
regulated commons management, preserves option value, allows 
modularity, and allows combination of routes. In short, operators 
 
 133 See, e.g., Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Another Look at Airport 
Congestion Pricing, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1970 (2007). 
 134 David C. Parkes & Lyle H. Ungar, An Auction-Based Method for 
Decentralized Train Scheduling, PROC. OF THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS AGENTS, 43, 43–50 (2001). 
 135 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 81, at 149 (indicating that providers have 
an incentive to privately negotiate interoperability: “[m]ore and more firms, 
especially in the information business, are shedding their proprietary approaches 
in favor of interoperability at multiple levels. The goal is not to be charitable to 
competitors or customers, of course, but to maximize returns over time by 
building an ecosystem with others that holds greater promise than the go-it-alone 
approach.”). 
 136 Id. at 107. 
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would have more freedom to expand routes and recombine routes in 
response to business opportunities. 
Exclusive-use rights also free companies from possible 
equipment mandates to operate on a regulated commons system. 
Exclusive use limits the need, for instance, for mandated high-
precision, interoperable, and expensive (regulated) sensor systems. 
Firms can optimize their own systems without concerning 
themselves with the capabilities and technologies of competing 
systems since airspace assignment would physically separate VTOL 
flight corridors. Sensor systems require a significant amount of 
computational and battery overhead and add weight to aircraft. 
Exclusive use means the assurance of clear airspace and should 
allow VTOL operators more freedom to reduce the number and 
complexity of sensors. 
Spectrum illustrates how important these dynamic efficiencies 
are, because there are “huge variations in the intensity of use of 
different portions of the spectrum” based on the underlying rules.137 
Spectrum auctions have been a tremendous policy success largely 
because spectrum uses are delegated to several companies on a 
geographically exclusive basis.138 Exclusive-use airspace tracts give 
companies more freedom to iterate on their private UTM systems—
similar to how cellular companies iterate upon and upgrade their 
radio access network technologies—and find operational 
 
 137 Epstein, supra note 4, at 213. 
 138 Aside from the substantial government revenues, the private investment in 
directly ancillary products and services (mobile devices, apps, nationwide fiber 
and mobile networks) and consumer welfare gains have been massive. Thomas 
Hazlett noted in 2005 when exclusively assigned by the FCC: 
[Spectrum] is intensively shared. Common access among millions of subscribers 
is organized by network operators which, with broad rights to control the use of 
specific frequencies, invest heavily to provide opportunities for consumers to 
communicate via wireless networks. This investment can be summarized in both 
physical capital-for instance, the creation of 174,368 cellular base stations-and 
financial capital-the expenditure of $156 billion in aggregate capital investment 
(book value through June 2004). 
Hazlett, supra note 72, at 249. 
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efficiencies that would not be possible with a shared, interoperable 
UTM system.139 
Second, the transferability and subleasing of airspace tracts 
means first-movers and existing technologies are not unduly favored 
in initial allocation. It is self-evident that the UTM systems and 
VTOL aircraft of today will improve, if permitted, since they 
involve emerging technologies. A unified UTM and regulator-
assigned routes and vertiports injects rigidity into the system since 
the community-based traffic management system that regulators 
envision would require new operators who wish to enter the market 
or introduce new routes, more frequent flights, or new vertiports to 
receive buy-in from competitors and regulators.140 The ability to 
transfer and lease airspace tracts means that incumbent users have a 
financial incentive to transfer the resource to its highest-valued use 
and to new entrants. At present, there is no mechanism in the UTM 
plans for incentivizing incumbent VTOL operators to transfer routes 
to new, innovative entrants. 
Third, competitive bidding and a secondary market in airspace 
tracts compels operators to reveal truthful information about their 
value for the resource. Once a UTM system is designed and selected, 
regulators and their approved UTM operators cannot expect VTOL 
operators “with private information about its time constraints, value, 
and costs” to report accurate access valuations to a centralized 
 
 139 Preliminary evidence from drone flights suggest the benefit of a single 
operator. Medical drones in Rwanda “fly[] in the exact same path. This is how we 
ensure that the system operates in a predictable, reliable, ultimately boring way. 
Logistics should be boring. There shouldn’t be any surprises.” Owning “the full 
stack” is important because “when one small team of hardworking engineers can 
own the entire system from scratch you can move fast.” Alice Lloyd George, 
Using drones to build the ambulance fleet of the future, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 25, 
2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/25/using-drones-to-build-the-ambulance-
fleet-of-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/R545-VNDY]. Similarly, drone deliveries in 
Iceland are operating with exclusive, fixed routes. Phillip E. Ross, Are Delivery 
Drones Commercially Viable? Iceland Is About to Find Out, IEEE SPECTRUM 
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/drones/are-delivery-drones-
commercially-viable-iceland-is-about-to-find-out [https://perma.cc/NP2C-
2XK8]. 
 140 NASA, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
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allocator.141 Operators will misrepresent or omit information when 
“it will improve its own schedule in the system-wide solution.”142 
This is the experience of traditional airlines, for instance, which 
hoard allocated slots and fly unprofitable flights in order to maintain 
the valuable routes.143 Further, shared routes and terminals 
encourage overscheduling since the gains from a reduction in use 
cannot be internalized by the innovative or efficient company.144 
Overscheduling, therefore, can be a tactic to raise rivals’ costs,145 
and should be anticipated with a shared UTM system. 
Fourth, exclusive, geographic rights to airspace tracts give 
licensees stability of possession that induces the significant 
investment necessary for mass air taxi operations. Long-term 
licenses give companies the assurance they need to make high-fixed 
costs for permitting, vertiports, electrical grid upgrades, 
concessions, and related infrastructure construction. With a 
regulated commons and sharing of routes and terminals, investments 
are more precarious because continued operations depend on 
regulators’ ad hoc decisions at who receives airspace and terminal 
access during times of congestion.146 In contrast, when a single party 
exclusively controls routes and terminals, delays, congestion, and 
cancellations are internalized.147 This internalization of costs should 
 
 141 Parkes & Ungar, supra note 134, at 43. 
 142 Id. 
 143 DJ Gribbin et al., supra note 10; Levine, supra note 95, at 58–59. 
 144 Traditional airlines overschedule operations and “generat[e] excessive flight 
delays, cancellations, and loss-of-separation violations” because if an airline acts 
responsibly and doesn’t overschedule at a busy airport, it has simply given a 
competitor opportunities to schedule more flights. BALL ET AL., supra note 85, at 
954. 
 145 BALL ET AL., supra note 85, at 954–55. 
 146 NASA, supra note 3, at 4–5. 
 147 There’s some evidence for this in the aviation literature. See Jan K. 
Brueckner, Airport Congestion When Carriers Have Market Power, 92 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1357, 1357–58 (2002) (finding that a monopoly airline “internalizes 
the congestion each flight imposes on the other flights it operates”) (emphasis in 
original). Further, using empirical evidence of the 25 most delayed US airports, 
“delays fall as airline market power rises.” Id. at 1371; see also C. Mayer & T. 
Sinai, Network Effects, Congestion Externalities, and Air Traffic Delays: Or Why 
Not All Delays Are Evil, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1194, 1206 (2003) (“We also find 
evidence that airports with low concentration have higher delays, possibly 
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operate as a powerful incentive to maintain infrastructure and 
systems. 
Finally, a system for auctioning geographic aerial tracts for 
VTOL service reduces the number of dimensions with which 
aviation regulators need to concern themselves. Geographic 
partition and auction of airspace would allow for the competitive 
development of UTM and reduce contests over airspace and 
vertiport access. With no need to prescribe technology standards, 
referee conflicts over congested urban airspace, and select amongst 
many UTM operators, the FAA could focus on its core mission of 
safety. This includes developing separation standards, testing new 
VTOLs for airworthiness, identifying emergency landing areas in 
urban areas, and developing standards for vertiport construction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Technology improvements have made the prospect for mass air 
transit plausible, and regulators and manufacturers globally are 
racing towards autonomous flight. However, technology shocks can 
create resource conflicts and the need for a dramatic shift in legal 
institutions. U.S. regulators are public trustees of federal airspace 
and should study long-standing practices towards the disposition of 
assets. In particular, the identification and auction of geographic 
tracts of airspace could give VTOL and aviation startups the 
possession stability they need to maximize investment in 
autonomous technology and ground-based facilities. The lessons 
from the auction of other federal assets like spectrum, oil fields, and 
wind energy leases are not dispositive, but they provide evidence 
that auctioning airspace tracts could allow for the rapid and safe 







because carriers do not fully internalize the costs their flights impose on other 
carriers.”). 
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